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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

IN RE ADOPTION/GUARDIANSHIP OF RASHA WN H.: WHEN
TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS COURTS MUST MAKE
SPECIFIC EVIDENTIARY FINDINGS REGARDING EACH
STATUTORY FACTOR AND EXPLAIN CLEARLY HOW
THOSE FINDINGS REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF
MAINTAINING THE PARENTAL RELATIONSHIP.
By: Matthew Hartman

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that in order to rebut the
presumption favoring a continuation of the parental relationship,
courts must carefully explain why their findings with respect to the
relevant
statutory
factors
sufficiently
do
so.
In
re
Adoption/Guardianship of Rashawn H., 402 Md. 477, 937 A.2d 177
(2007). The Court now requires trial courts to produce more detailed
decisions regarding the termination of parental rights ("TPR"). Id. at
505 n.12, 937 A.2d at 194 n.12.
Ms. F. is the mother of Rashawn and Tyrese, the children who were
the subject of the petition at issue. Ms. F. and Richard, the father,
were living with Ms. F.'s mother in 2001, but were evicted because
Ms. F. 's mother had been selling drugs out of their apartment. In the
three years after that eviction, the family moved eleven times. The
family eventually stayed with a friend of Richard until Richard was
incarcerated in May 2004, when they were forced to move. Ms. F. then
took the children to the local Department of Social Services ("DSS")
office, and the children were placed in emergency shelter care. In
June 2004, a juvenile court declared Rashawn and Tyrese as children
in need of assistance ("eINA"). A DSS psychological evaluation
found Ms. F. "cognitively challenged," showing little parenting ability
and lacking in job skills. Eventually, Ms. F. found a job with WalMart and demonstrated improvement, as well as compliance with the
majority of the court's orders. She was, however, unable to find public
housing despite DSS assistance because of her prior drug related
eviction. In November 2005, the juvenile court directed DSS to file a
petition to terminate parental rights because of the length of time the
children had been in foster care, Ms. F.'s inability to find adequate
housing, and a lack of suitable relatives to provide long-term care.
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The Frederick County DSS filed a petition to terminate Ms. F.'s
parental rights with respect to Rashawn and Tyrese in December 2005.
The Circuit Court for Frederick County found by clear and convincing
evidence that it was in the best interest of the children to grant the
petition, and entered judgments severing Ms. F. 's parental rights to
Rashawn and Tyrese. The trial court found that DSS could meet the
children's health and safety needs if it was granted guardianship. The
trial court also found that despite DSS's efforts to provide Ms. F. with
services, her situation was not "working," and that Ms. F.'s mother's
history of drug abuse made her an unacceptable candidate for housing.
Ms. F. noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,
where she argued that the trial court's findings were either unsupported
by the facts or erroneous. She also contended that DSS failed to adjust
its services to fit her unique situation. The Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland found that the trial court's findings were supported by the
record and affirmed the trial court's ruling. Ms. F. petitioned for, and
received, certiorari from the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland vacated the trial court's
judgments and remanded for further proceedings. In re Rashawn H,
402 Md. at 505, 937 A.2d at 194. The Court was concerned with the
trial court's presentation of its findings and the explanation of how
those findings overcame the presumption in favor of continuing Ms.
F.'s parental rights. Id. at 504, 937 A.2d at 193. The Court instructed
the trial court to make "clear and specific findings" with respect to
each factor within section 5-323 of the Family Law Article of the
Maryland Annotated Code ("section 5-323 "), and to clearly explain
"how and why" those findings lead to a conclusion that Ms. F. is
"unfit" or that "exceptional circumstances" exist that are sufficient to
terminate her parental rights. In re Rashawn H, 402 Md. at 505, 937
A.2d at 194.
The Court first explained the standard for TPR. Id. at 494, 937
A.2d at 187. A TPR hearing is grounded in a legal preference in favor
of the parental relationship. Id. at 495, 937 A.2d at 188. The right to
maintain a parental relationship is a fundamental, constitutionally
based right. Id. at 495, 937 A.2d at 188. The Court has harmonized
this preference with the "best interest of the child standard,"
presuming both in law and in fact that it is in the best interest of the
child to remain in the care of his parents. Id. at 495,937 A.2d at 188.
Despite this presumption, the best interest of the children will be the
deciding factor when the rights of parents heavily contradict the State's
interest in protecting children from abuse and neglect. Id. at 496, 937
A.2d at 189.
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The Court described three elements that serve to protect the
parental relationship in TPR cases. Id. at 498, 937 A,2d at 190. The
first and most important element is the legal presumption in favor of
continuing the parental relationship. Id. at 498,937 A,2d at 190. Only
a showing of unfitness or exceptional circumstances that make the
parental relationship detrimental to the child's best interests can rebut
this presumption. Id. at 498,937 A.2d at 190. This presumption is not
statutory, but is implied by the statutory scheme. Id. at 498, 937 A.2d
at 190. In a TPR case, the Court stated, the proper focus is whether
the unfitness or exceptional circumstances render a continued parental
relationship detrimental to the child. Id. at 498,937 A,2d at 190. The
focus on the continuation of the relationship, rather than parental
custody, is significant because a TPR judgment cannot readily be
undone. Id. at 498,937 A.2d at 190.
The second factor protecting the parental relationship is the
requirement that the State establish, by clear and convincing evidence,
a parent's unfitness or other exceptional circumstances. !d. at 498, 937
A,2d at 190. The third factor protecting the relationship is that the
Legislature, through section 5-323, limited the court's discretion in
severing the parental relations by stating specific criteria by which
"TPR" should be reviewed. In re Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 498, 937
A.2d at 190. The legislature has stated the criteria to be reviewed in
section 5-323 of the Family Law Article. In re Rashawn H., 402 Md.
at 498, 937 A.2d at 190.
The Court determined that the trial court failed to make clear that
its ruling was based on clear and convincing evidence, and not just a
mere preponderance of evidence. Id. at 504-05, 937 A.2d at 194.
Regarding the health and safety factor of the statute, the trial court
noted that the children had "special needs," but did not identify those
needs or explain how DSS would be able to better meet those needs
than it would if Ms. F. retained her parental rights. Id. at 504, 937
A,2d at 193. The Court also noted that the "feelings toward and
emotional ties with the [children's] natural parents" were factors to be
considered. Id. at 504, 937 A.2d at 193. The trial court said it was
"not sure" whether the children retained much attachment. Id. at 504,
937 A.2d at 193. The Court rejected the notion that "not sure" could
suffice under the requirement for clear and convincing evidence. Id. at
504, 937 A,2d at 194. Additionally, the trial court discussed Ms. F.'s
efforts to maintain contact with her children, but did not state any
findings regarding the adequacy of her efforts. Id. at 504,937 A,2d at
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194. The Court ordered the trial court to, on remand, be much more
specific regarding its findings and to clearly tie those findings to the
factors necessary to terminate parental rights. Id. at 504-05, 937 A.2d
at 194.
The Court is not changing the law in In re Rashawn H., but is
changing how the law should be approached and addressed. The
Court explained that, because of the importance of protecting the
parent-child relationship, each statutory factor in TPR proceedings
must be clearly and specifically addressed and related to parental
unfitness or exceptional circumstances. Practitioners will be able to
use this heightened review of TPR judgments to force trial courts to
clearly and convincingly address issues that may otherwise evade
scrutiny. It is no surprise that the Court, after questioning the
articulation of the findings, suggested that the parties involved be
allowed to offer new evidence on the situation between Ms. F. and her
children.

